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On Developing a Solvency 
Framework for Bookmakers
by Dominic Cortis
ABSTRACT
The betting industry has grown significantly but there have been 
no developments in creating a regulatory framework akin to  
the EU Solvency and Capital Requirement Directives in the 
Financial Services. This work derives a modular method to  
calculate the profit and variance of a portfolio of wagers placed 
with a bookmaker by subdividing these into bundles according 
to their likelihood size. This calls for improved risk manage-
ment and regulatory set-ups similar to those of the financial 
services industry, which should include a minimum capital 
requirement for bookmakers to accept a particular number  
of bets — “A passport for taking risks.”
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1906; Markov 1971). Modern theory of probability is 
based on Andrey Kolmogorov’s (1903–1987) work 
on measure theory. Other significant theories within 
probability theory during the last century include 
Markowitz theory of portfolio selection (Markowitz 
1952), Monte-Carlo simulation, game theory and 
chaos theory.
More recently betting markets have been of great 
interest to economists and other researchers mainly 
because they can be interpreted to be a simple alter-
native to financial markets (Lessmann, Sung, and 
Johnson 2009; Sauer 1998; Shin 1993; Tirole 1982). 
Participants in both markets have large money at stake 
that is used to make a profit based on different beliefs 
and information at hand, making this a zero-sum 
game (Levitt 2004). Lessman, Sung and Johnson 
(2009) and Sauer (1998) extend this further by imply-
ing that gambling markets act as simple financial 
markets since they provided a clearer view of pric-
ing issues. Cases of investigations in betting markets 
include inquiries in insider trading (Schnyzter and 
Shilony 1995; Shin 1993; Vaughan, Williams, and 
Paton 1997), herding behavior (Buhagiar, Cortis 
and Newall 2018; Law and Peel 2002), a comparison 
of group to individual decision making (Adams and 
Ferreira 2009) and market efficiency (Cortis, Hales, 
and Bezzina 2013; Terrell and Farmer 1996; Woodland 
and Woodland 2001).
A further motivation is the actual size of the indus-
try itself (Levitt 2004). In particular the gambling 
industry is a key contributor to the gross domestic 
product (GDP) of some jurisdictions. For instance, it 
contributes to over 10% of the Maltese GDP (Agius 
2014). On a smaller relative scale, betting on out-
comes, also referred to as sports betting, is a sub-
category of gambling that contributed £2.3 billion 
(circa 0.16%) to the United Kingdom GDP in 2011 
(Deloitte 2013).
During 2014 the sports betting industry is esti-
mated to have made gross gambling revenue (GGR), 
evaluated as wagers less winning pay outs, of around 
forty five billion euro (H2 Gambling Capital, Novem-
ber 20, 2014). Interactive betting, which includes 
internet and mobile betting, has been a key driver 
1. Introduction
Actuaries are leading professionals in managing 
risk (BeAnActuary.org 2015) and consequently have 
ventured into nontraditional research sometimes with 
impressive outcomes. Two such cases are Tilley’s 
(1993) seminal paper showing the first Monte Carlo 
method to price a derivative option with early exercise 
features and Redington’s development of immuniza-
tion theory (Redington 1952).
Gambling is at times considered in a bad light, a 
vice not to be discussed in an academic or research 
setting except for evaluating its negative social impli-
cations. Yet gambling has been instrumental to the 
development of probability (David 1962). Gerolamo 
Cardano (1501–1576) was an astrologer, physician, 
mathematician and gambler who, in an attempt to 
understand games of chance, first coined the classical 
definition of probability: Given a total number n of 
equally possible outcomes of which m result in the 
occurrence of a given event, then the probability of 
that event occurring is m
n .
However, many recognize Chevalier de Mere’s 
(1607–1684) questions on gambling games (specifi-
cally his continuous losses and the problem of points) 
along with Blaise Pascal (1623–1662) as the initial 
foundations to probability theory. Pascal famously 
discussed the problem of points in his correspondence 
with Pierre de Fermat and, through their discussions, 
these two mathematicians developed the initial stages 
for probability. Pascal was also instrumental in encour-
aging Christiaan Huygens (1629–1695) to write the 
first book on probability theory, De Ratiociniis in 
Ludo Aleae (On Reasoning in Games of Chance), in 
1657 (Bernstein 1998).
Pierre-Simon Laplace (1749–1827) introduced the 
application of probability theory to scientific and 
practical problems in the early nineteenth century 
and this spurred the developments of the theory of 
errors, Bayes’ theory, statistics and actuarial math-
ematics during the same century. Subsequently 
Markov chains, which are extensively used in sto-
chastic processes, were introduced in 1906 (Markov 
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instant; in another example, insurers do not reserve 
the sum insured of all policies since not all extreme 
adverse events are likely to occur at the same time. In 
this respect, this paper introduces a method to evalu-
ate risk metrics that can be extended to limit, grant or 
insure a bookmaker.
Managing a bookmaker has many similarities to 
running an insurer. A bet can interpreted as an insur-
ance cover that pays out contingent on an outcome 
occurring. Therefore, betting and insurance share the 
same common theme with only a few differences. 
First, there must be insurable interest for one to open 
up an insurance policy while one must be indepen-
dent of an outcome to bet on it. A contract that pays 
the author $1,000 on Queen Elizabeth II’s death is a 
bet, not an insurance policy, given that the author has 
no insurable interest in the queen’s survival. Second, 
the value of a pay out on an insurance claim can 
fluctuate, especially in a general business scenario, 
while that of a bet tends to be fixed. For example, 
a car accident may be a few dollars in the case 
of a scratch to millions if it results in deaths. There 
are alternative situations, such as the fluctuating 
pay out on a spread-bet1 or the fixed predetermined 
amount paid on an injury at work covered by a 
workers’ compensation scheme. A third difference 
together with deregulation to the increase in sports 
betting (European Gaming and Betting Association 
2014; Fawcett 2014; Griffiths 2004). Indeed, there 
has been an increase of over 200% in GGR of inter-
active sports betting over the past ten years, as shown 
in Figure 1. There are no signs of a change in the 
trend of a growing sports betting market as mobile 
and social gaming become more popular (Torres 
and Goggin 2014) and governments are viewing the 
regulation of the industry as possible economic and 
taxation gain rather than controlling a vice (Atkinson, 
Nichols, and Oleson 2000). Such a development could 
happen in the USA, where sports betting is illegal in 
most states by federal law. Although this has been 
challenged unsuccessfully by a New Jersey law that 
lost the case up to appeals court (Reuters 2015), more 
movements are expected to focus on liberating the 
market in lieu of the significant amount wagered 
illegally in the USA.
Due to the size of the market, the solvency of book-
makers is an issue to be addressed with a similar 
rigour to that of financial institutions. Bookmakers 
are not immune to making losses (e.g., iGaming 
Business 2013, 2014), and bookmakers cannot be 
expected to keep a reserve equivalent to all out-
comes. In a similar vein, banks reserve a proportion 
of their depositors’ funds as they assume that not all 
depositors will withdraw their investments at the same 
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Figure 1. Estimated Yearly Gross Gambling Revenues (H2 Gambling Capital, 
November 20, 2014)
1This acts just like a forward/future.
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to be a constant factor that grosses up real-to-implied 
probability for all outcomes (e.g., Archontakis and 
Osborne 2007; Cortis, Hales, and Bezzina 2013; 
Goddard and Asimakopoulos 2004; Zafiris 2014), but 
other approaches, such as using a finite list of odds 
(Koch and Shing 2008) or conversions minimizing 
the effects of insider trading (Shin 1993; Sˇ trumbelj 
2014), are also possible.
Cortis (2015) shows that for a market with n out-
comes each denoted i with real probability of occur-
ring pi such that Σ
n
i=1 pi = 1 and a wager wi made on 
each outcome i; the profitability for the bookmaker 
has a mean and variance as shown in Equation 1, if a 
constant bookmaker margin of k is assumed,
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This has been further expanded such that the 
real probability is not required to be known by a 
bookmaker to have positive expected profits. For 
example, the odds on the match outcome for Phil-
adelphia Eagles – Atlanta Falcons NFL match as 
circled in Figure 2 indicate implied probabilities 
of 
+
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59.51% and 
+
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100 133
42.92% for
 
each team to win, respectively. The total implied 
probabilities add up to 102.43%, where the excess 
of 2.43% is the bookmaker margin denoted as k in 
Equation 1. Therefore using this equation, Pinnacle 
Sports expects to make a profit of 2.43
102.43
2.37%=
 
of the total wagers made on match outcome for 
this case.
The findings can be extended to multiples or accu-
mulators, which are a series of bets made on m inde-
pendent events, by Equation 2. This is equivalent to 
Equation 1, assuming an overall bookmaker margin 
of (1 + km)m – 1. In an applied scenario this means 
that wagers on high odds are likely to be multiples and 
therefore placed at higher overall bookmaker margin. 
Indeed, the bookmaker profits on multiples are much 
is that the timing of a bet is usually known because 
it is paid at the end of an event, while the trigger 
for an insurance pay out may fluctuate. The model 
presented here can be considered as the equivalent 
of an insurer’s underwriting risk under a Solvency II 
framework for a bookmaker.
The next section introduces the key relevant find-
ings from other publications. These lead to the core 
of the paper: a method to evaluate the distribution of 
a portfolio of bets placed with a bookmaker and sub-
sequently the determination of bookmaker solvency. 
Finally, the conclusion is preceded by a discussion 
of challenges in applying this method as well as its 
possible extensions.
2. Distribution of odds
Bookmakers set odds on outcomes of different 
events on which customers can place wagers. Typi-
cally these are set in different markets since there 
are various outcomes from one event. For example 
the 1X2 market in a soccer match (the event) might 
result into three outcomes (home team win, draw, 
away team win). The same event could be used to 
determine the half-time 1X2 market. Furthermore, 
odds can be displayed in a variety of manners.2 One 
such method is European (or decimal) odds whereby 
the odd is the reciprocal of the probability. For exam-
ple, an odd of two represents an implied probability 
of one half. Another method is American Money- 
Line Odds that display the amount to be wagered to 
win 100 units for likely events and the amount to be 
won on a 100-unit wager on unlikely events.
In order for bookmakers to be able to make profits, 
the sum of implied probabilities of all mutually 
exclusive outcomes for any market adds up to more 
than 100% (Cain, Law, and Peel 2003; Cortis, Hales, 
and Bezzina 2013; Peel and Thomas 1992; Sˇ trumbelj 
2014; Zafiris 2014). The excess of this sum over 100% 
is called the bookmaker margin, the over-round or the 
vig. Typically the bookmaker margin is considered 
2Cortis (2015) gives a detailed overview of different methods of display-
ing odds.
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to no multiples refer to the same events. Consider 
the following multiple/accumulator bets made on 
the 2014 International Basketball Federation (FIBA) 
World Cup as shown in Figure 3.
• Bet α: Bet on Iran to win their match versus France 
@ 6.880 and Bet on Croatia to win their match versus 
Puerto Rico @ 1.309 for total odd 9.006.
• Bet β: Bet on Puerto Rico to win versus Croatia 
@ 3.830 and Argentina to win versus Greece @ 
3.160 for total odd 12.103.
• Bet γ: Bet on Argentina to win versus Greece and 
Turkey to win versus Dominican Republic @ 3.16 
and 1.595, respectively, for total odd 5.040.
• Bet p: Bet on Lithuania to win versus Slovenia 
@2.030.
In this case, bets α and β are mutually exclusive 
since Croatia are playing Puerto Rico, while bets β 
and γ have a positive correlation as they both depend 
on Argentina winning. Bet p is independent of other 
bets. Assuming that these bets were made in the given 
order, bet β reduces the total variance in company 
profits since it acts as a hedge to bet α. On the other 
hand, bet γ increases risk by a larger factor than bet p.
The portfolio of bets placed with a bookmaker is 
constantly changing, especially with the popularity 
of live in-play betting (Hogg 2013; Keogh and Rose 
2013; Newall 2017; Robinson 2012) which is the 
possibility of placing wagers of outcomes while a 
match is being played (Brown 2012; Croxton and 
Reade 2014). Therefore a simple estimate is required.
higher than those on normal bets3 (Cain, Law and 
Peel 2003; Cortis 2015; Zafiris 2014).
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 represents the total amount wagered on a 
multiple bet that pays out if all outcomes i1, i2 to im 
within independent events 1,2,3, . . . , m respectively 
occur.
3. Bookmaker’s portfolio
In calculating the variance of company profits for 
multiples placed over the same set of m events, 
multiple outcomes are mutually exclusive and com-
plete the probability space of all outcomes. However, 
a company typically offers a significantly large 
number of events to place wagers on, such that little 
Time
NFL
Game Spread Money Line Total
16.10 –2.5
–2
+2.5
+2
–124
–103
+112
+107
–147
–123
+133
+111
–103
–108
Over 41.5
Over 55
–107
–102
Under 41.5
Under 55
19.20
Philadelphia Eagles
Atlanta Falcons
Minnesota Vikings
San Francisco 49ers
Figure 2. Odds on National Football League as at 03:20CDT on September 14, 2014 as shown  
on Pinnacle Sports
3An example is given in the Appendix.
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estimated as shown in Equation 3. This is a straight-
forward application of Equation 1.
Var W
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Since each bundle contains n bets, we can evaluate 
the total bundle variance Varq (Equation 4) as the 
addition of all variances per bet (Var–––q). This takes 
into consideration the average correlation for all pairs 
of bets within a particular bundle, denoted as r.
Var nVar r Var Var
nVar C rVar
q q q q
q
n
q
2
2 . (4)2
∑( )
( )
= +
= +
The variance of a bundle can fluctuate to any-
where between zero to just under n2Var–––q. In an 
applicative scenario, it would be recommended to 
back-test the correlation between all bets made within 
a particular bundle. The value of p 2w1 furthermore 
helps in controlling the dispersion in the amount of 
odds as a possible consideration for bundling could 
My proposition is to subdivide the portfolio of 
bets wagered with a bookmaker in bundles according 
to odds, evaluate the distribution of each bundle 
separately, and then calculate the distribution of 
the portfolio. These bundles can be set according to 
the odd grids set up by the bookmaker, but the odds 
offered to customers will increase significantly if 
multiples are used. Therefore, a range of odds within 
each bundle would be preferable.
3.1. Variance per bundle
For each bundle q, evaluate the distribution of 
wagers W ∼ N(W–q, p 2wq); the number of different 
wagers,4 denoted nq; the geometric mean of the 
market spread kq (weighted by nq) over these bets5; 
and the arithmetic mean of odds offered pq. The aver-
age variance per bet, denoted Var–––q, can be therefore 
4Bets on the same set of outcomes are to be counted as one wager. For 
example if two people bet different amounts on the same outcome, this is 
to be treated as one wager. 
5The rationale for using the geometric mean of the market spread is 
derived from the variance shown in Equation 5. The multiplicative 
effect of this value indicates it is safer to use the geometric mean rather 
than the arithmetic mean. A possible extension would be that bundles are 
selected such that the geometric mean, arithmetic mean and median are 
significantly close. 
Figure 3. Odds available on Pinnacle as at 10:49 CDT on September 4, 2014
FIBA WORLD CUP - MEN BASKETBALL - THU 9/4
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Croatia
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Turkey
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Serbia
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+12
–12
–7
+7
+1
–1
–4
+4
–16.5
+16.5
+5.5
–5.5
1.990
1.917
1.943
1.961
1.980
1.925
1.980
1.925
1.917
1.990
1.970
1.934
1.952
1.952
1.952
1.952
1.934
1.970
1.961
1.943
1.943
1.961
1.961
1.943
Over 143.5
Under 143.5
Over 159.5
Under 159.5
Over 153
Under 153
Over 139
Under 139
Over 152
Under 152
Over 154.5
Under 154.5
6.880
1.137
1.309
3.830
2.030
1.877
1.595
2.520
3.160
1.413
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This assumption is also consistent with the expectan-
cies of a higher proportion of multiple/accumulator 
bets at higher odds. For example an odd with a like-
lihood of 0.01% is more likely to be a bet on a com-
bination of outcomes from different events, such as 
guessing the series of winners on 10 matches, rather 
than one outcome from a particular event. Equation 2 
shows that these bets will result in a higher betting 
margin per bet placed.
A presumption that one can make is that closer 
bundles are more likely to be related than distant 
ones. The reasoning behind this is that, since low 
odds imply high likelihood while high odds imply 
low likelihood, these are more likely to belong to a 
set of mutually exclusive outcomes. Although this 
might not be always true. For example, a market with 
many possible outcomes is likely to produce many 
high mutually exclusive odds. Notwithstanding, the 
correlation between different bundles can again range 
be the size of the wager. Assuming an infinite number 
of possibilities and a finite number of bets, the exam-
ple of no correlation is used, whereby Varq = nVar
–––
q, 
leading to the profitability of a bundle q, denoted Bq 
following the distribution shown in Equation 5. One 
can clearly notice the similarities of the per-bundle 
distribution, with the distribution per event shown in 
Equation 1.
B N
k
k
n W n W
k kq
q
q
q q q q
q1
,
1
1
1
1
.
(5)
2
2 ( ) ( )+ + pi − +








For instance, consider that a company has 300 bets 
of odds averaging at an odd of 1.07. The wagers have 
an average of 10 units and a bookmaker margin of 
5%. The profits in this bundle follow the distribution 
Bq ∼ N(142.86,3360.55) and have a probability of a 
loss of less than 0.7%.6 This result is highly sensitive 
to the correlation coefficient. If this was considered 
to be 0.5, then the variance of this bundle would be 
502401.36 and the probability of loss as high as 42%.7
3.2. Portfolio variance
Having calculated the parameters for each bundle, 
one can finally calculate the joint distribution for the 
company’s whole portfolio of bets. Assuming that 
b bundles are created, the total portfolio variance is 
∑sVars + 2∑s>trs,t Var Vars t  for s, t ∈ {1, 2, . . . , b} 
where rs,t is the correlation coefficient between 
bundles s and t.
As an example, consider calculating the distri-
bution of bookmaker profits for a portfolio of one 
hundred thousand bets uniformly subdivided over 
20 bundles as shown in Table 1. It is further assumed 
that the bookmaker margin per bundle increases 
for low-likelihood outlooks in line with the longshot 
bias, which states that the gap between real and 
implied probabilities is higher for less likely outcomes 
(Vaughan, Williams, and Paton 1997; Sˇtrumbelj 2014). 
61 – Φ(2.47)
71 – Φ(0.20)
Table 1. Wagers on a portfolio of bets with one bookmaker
Bundle 
(q) nq W
–
q kq pq E(Bq) Varq
1 5000 35 5.0% 97.5% 8333 654
2 5000 35 5.5% 92.5% 9123 879
3 5000 20 6.0% 87.5% 5660 613
4 5000 15 6.5% 82.5% 4577 537
5 5000 10 7.0% 77.5% 3271 408
6 5000 10 7.5% 72.5% 3488 457
7 5000 10 8.0% 67.5% 3704 507
8 5000 10 8.5% 62.5% 3917 559
9 5000 10 9.0% 57.5% 4128 614
10 5000 10 9.5% 52.5% 4338 673
11 5000 5 10.0% 47.5% 2273 369
12 5000 5 10.5% 42.5% 2376 405
13 5000 5 11.0% 37.5% 2477 446
14 5000 5 11.5% 32.5% 2578 494
15 5000 5 12.0% 27.5% 2679 553
16 5000 5 12.5% 22.5% 2778 629
17 5000 5 13.0% 17.5% 2876 731
18 5000 2 13.5% 12.5% 1189 354
19 5000 2 14.0% 7.5% 1228 467
20 5000 2 14.5% 2.5% 1266 827
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The distribution of the portfolio of bets placed 
with the bookmaker, denoted Port can therefore be 
evaluated as following the distribution:
Port N 72261,30026410 . (8) ( )
4. Determining solvency
The estimation of the expected profit and vari-
ance of a portfolio of bets for a bookmaker can lead 
to further tools for regulators and bookmakers to 
manage their own risk, here described as the devia-
tion from the expected. One application could be 
an extension of the six sigma method (Kwak and 
Anbari 2006; Schroeder, Linderman, Liedtke, and 
Choo 2008), whereby the expected profit of the 
portfolio needs to be at least four and a half times 
the standard deviation for the bookmaker to be able 
to operate.
Many financial regulatory regimes require a mini-
mum of capital funds to be held by the financial insti-
tution to operate. Such regimes tend to determine this 
amount as a percentile measure, typically the value-
at-risk (VaR) measure at some level of confidence. A 
clear example is the Solvency II insurance regime 
that is being introduced for the European insurance 
industry (Barbara et al. 2017; Doff 2008). The VaR 
evaluates the amount of capital required for the finan-
cial institution to be able to withstand extreme events. 
In layman terms, the VaR answers the question: What 
amount of capital is required for the company not to 
go bankrupt by x% probability?
This measure has been widely criticized from a 
theoretical perspective as it seems to suggest that a 
small level [(1 – x)%] of failures are tolerated (Doff 
2008), and it does not have adequate mathematical 
properties such as subadditivity (Acerbi and Tasche 
2002; Artzner, Delbaen, Eber, and Heath 1999; Dhaene 
et al. 2006).
Furthermore, VaR does not consider the magnitude 
of the losses beyond its value. In this respect, many 
recommend the use of the expected shortfall (ES), also 
referred to as the tail-value-at-risk (Acerbi and Tasche 
2002; Tasche 2002; Yamai and Yoshiba 2005). ES can 
between –1 and 1, but as a further specimen example, 
it can be set as shown in Equation 6.
r
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0.25; if 5, 6
0; if 6 14
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The total variance is calculated as Vector Varq  × 
Correlation Matrix × Vector T Varq  where the correla-
tion matrix is a 20 × 20 matrix showing the correla-
tions between different bundles and
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(7)Vector Varq
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of counter-parties since they operate in a highly lever-
aged environment with significant trade between the 
institutions.
In contrast to financial markets, the outcome of an 
event is not and should not be affected by a book-
maker since trade between bookmakers is currently 
minimal and bookmakers are not highly leveraged. 
The failures in application of mathematical develop-
ments in finance, such as risk models and derivatives, 
can also be blamed on misuse rather than simply 
design limitations (Bezzina and Grima 2012; Salmon 
2012). Moreover, mathematical models add insight 
(Geoffrion 1976) and provide a deeper understand-
ing of the sensitivities of output to changes (Thiele, 
Kurth, and Grimm 2014). A model cannot be assumed 
to describe perfectly the behavior of the underlying 
system but it gives us a chance to see how to react in 
the extreme case.
Another justification for imposed reserves on 
banks and insurances is that they provide services 
that are at times compulsory (such as car insurance) 
and act as a public good (Born 2001). The consider-
ation of the betting industry as a vice may limit devel-
opments in determining solvency regimes. There is a 
greater natural social desire to have banks, insurances 
and other financial institutions protect consumers 
who are saving their income or protecting their wealth 
and loved ones; the desire to protect individuals 
who gamble is less so. As an example, one would feel 
more empathy towards an individual whose insur-
ance is unable to settle claims for earthquake damage 
to her property due to the insurer’s insolvency rather 
than a bettor who did not receive his prize winnings 
due to the bookmaker’s insolvency.
Notwithstanding, both deserve their compensation. 
Another factor is that betting markets can serve as a 
public good, for example, by providing farmers with 
a likelihood of bad weather as evidence by odds on 
betting markets in order to hedge against the risk of 
low or no harvest (Hahn and Tetlock 2006). It is also 
unclear whether onerous regulatory regimes would 
result in entry barriers that would distort the market 
in the current betting industry environment of mergers 
and take-overs (e.g., Farrell 2015).
be described as the expected loss in the extreme per-
centile beyond the VaR.
5. Challenges and extensions
One key challenge in applying this method relates 
to which timeframe of bets to use: Should a book-
maker apply risk measurement for all bets placed 
within a particular time-frame, open at a particular 
moment or closing at a particular time-frame? The 
per-bundle parameters for each bookmaker can be 
calculated at different times and used to project future 
capital requirements. Furthermore, the use of different 
correlation parameters may result in evaluating best- 
estimate, pessimistic and optimistic measures, which 
are then utilized to rate the riskiness of each bookmaker.
On the plus side, the method presented here is 
modular and can be easily enriched. In the example 
shown here, each bundle has an equivalent range of 
implied probability (5%) even if realistically one 
would not expect many outcomes with a 95%–100% 
likelihood. Indeed, the ideal number of bundles and 
the subdivision of these would depend on the scenario 
at hand.8 The bundling technique may provide more 
accurate best-estimates if subdivided in more dimen-
sions such as the bookmaker margin, size of wagers, 
type of event, type of market, and timeframe.
The application of any model to measure risk is 
bound to be imperfect (Greenspan 2008) and there-
fore should not be an end-all. Following a number of 
model failures, many point out that risk models act 
more as a false sense of security rather than a proven 
system for insolvency prevention (Colander et al. 
2009; Daníelsson 2002). On a similar tone, many 
have investigated inadequacies in the models used to 
measure risk in the financial sector (e.g., Berkowitz 
and O’Brien 2002) or discussed methods on how to 
asses these (Kupiec 1995). Fundamentally financial 
institutions operate in a market in which their actions 
affect the value of market securities (Colander et al. 
2009) and financial models depend on the solvency 
8Buhagiar, Cortis and Newall (2017) use an interesting iterative approach 
to bundle odds in their investigation of over 150,000 European Soccer odds.
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over the past few years (Ring, Bryce, McKinney, and 
Webb 2014). Similarly as the gambling sector con-
tinues to grow; a consolidated regulatory and internal 
approach to risk would promote active management 
of own risks, increase customer protection, enhance 
investors’ ability to analyze bookmakers, and reduce 
regulatory arbitrage.
This paper introduces a method that measures 
the betting risk of a bookmaker by subdividing bets 
in different bundles. The model presented here is 
based on a number of assumptions such as distribu-
tions being mainly normal distributed, bundle sizes 
being equal, and internal correlation for each bundle 
being zero. This leads to significant scope for further 
research that would focus on ideal bundling regime, 
actual experienced per-bundle correlations, and chal-
lenges in setting up a risk-management framework 
that adapts this risk measurement technique.
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Appendix A. Multiples result  
in higher betting margins
Consider a scenario of three events (Event A, B, C) 
with two binary equally outcomes (i, ii) each. Assum-
ing a bookmaker margin of 5%, then all odds would be 
at 0.5–1 1.05–1 = 1.905. The wager on an accumulator/
multiple bet Ai-Bi-Ci that pays out only if all three 
outcomes occur is 1.9053 = 6.911.
There are eight such possible bets (23). Consider-
ing the combination of such mutually accumulators/ 
multiples as one event with eight outcomes, the total 
implied probability space adds up to 8(6.911–1) = 1.158, 
which is a betting margin of 1.053 – 1 = 15.8%.
While one can argue that any formal quantitative 
requirements would increase regulatory and enforce-
ment costs, bookmakers and regulators are already 
significantly data-intensive enterprises and should 
be able to cope with new quantitative improvements. 
Nevertheless implementation of quantitative require-
ments may not be as straightforward as the experience 
of implementing Solvency II for insurance solvency 
regimes in Europe has shown.
Some regulators, such as the ones based in Malta 
and Gibraltar, would benefit greatly from a reputa-
tional perspective by ensuring that one of their largest 
industries are solvent. Likewise countries were a 
significant number of wagers are placed, such as 
the United Kingdom, would also benefit by add-
ing more rigorous measures that protect customers. 
Yet the greatest benefactors would most likely be 
bookmakers themselves. Currently, the solvency is 
a one-by-one scenario; usually being covered by a 
bank guarantee may be an inefficient allocation of 
capital. Runs of this model held on different assump-
tions show that a bookmaker would be solvent if well 
diversified. That is, unless the operator has some 
concentration of risk — say a Greek bookmaker is 
more at a risk of default if Greece wins the European 
Soccer tournament another time since it would have 
many local sentimental bets.
The gambling industry is currently a revenue 
source for states and governments, but the introduc-
tion of quantitative requirements may increase regula-
tion costs. The additional cost is likely to be financed 
by increased fees and penalties, rather than public 
financing, which costs may be ultimately borne by 
gamblers. Lessons learned from the implementation 
of the insurance regime would entice any implementa-
tion of a bookmakers’ solvency regime to be simpler 
in order to minimize costs and time to enactment.
6. Conclusion
The setting of reserves of a portfolio of bets wagered 
with a bookmaker is therefore a gap that needs to be 
addressed. Financial regulation has focused signifi-
cantly on risk measurement, management and culture 
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